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I.

INTRODUCTION

Damages to be awarded to a lost volume seller have been the subject of much debate. The question has periodically been wrestled with
both judicially and academically. Differences of opinion focus on the
proper measure of a volume seller's expectation interest, if such an interest exists, and whether damages should be based on some calculus of
lost profit or market damages. Despite the attempt to codify and harmonize the Law Merchant, the law of sales under the Uniform Sales Act,
the Uniform Commercial Code, and the collective understanding of
those engaged in commerce, the debate over the proper measure of the
seller's expectation interest has continued. In many instances, the con* Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University, J.D., 1997: LL.M. candidate, New
York University. I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Clark Johnson for his efforts and
assistance in the development of this article.
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tract price and market price differ to the extent that market-measured
damages are sufficient to compensate the aggrieved seller.' However, in
other instances, particularly in the case of fixed price goods, the contract
price and market price may differ little or not at all. Using the market
differential formula to calculate damages, the lack of disparity leaves the
seller with nominal or no damages upon the buyer's breach. 2 So the
debate ensues as to whether such a seller should be awarded lost profits
in order to fulfill his expectation interest. One of the most discussed
problems within this issue is that of the "lost volume seller."
Simply defined, a lost volume seller is one whose supply is, as a
practical matter, unlimited in comparison to the demand for the product.3 The problem arises where, upon the buyer's breach, the lost volume seller resells the goods intended for the first buyer to another buyer.
The basis of the lost volume seller's claim is that but-for the buyer's
breach, the seller could have realized a second sale, and earned an additional profit. Pursuant to the lost volume theory, the seller is permitted
to claim lost profits unreduced by any profit made on the turnaround
sale.
An obstacle to the permanent implantation of this doctrine is the
literal and possibly uninformed reading of UCC § 2-708(2). Under section 2-708(2), a seller may seek lost profits from a breaching buyer so
long as the market differential is inadequate to place the seller in the
position he would have been had the original contract been performed.'
The lost volume controversy centers upon the last clause of section 21. See U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (1994).
2. WILLIAM H. HENNING & GEORGE I. WALLACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE Ij 8.05[1][a] (1992).
3. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §14-23, at 627

(3d ed. 1987). Defining a lost volume seller is an enormous debate in and of itself. Some
commentators try to define a lost volume seller as simply a seller whose supply exceeds its

demand such that the seller could have supplied both buyers. See, e.g., ROBERT A. HnmA, ET
AL., COMMON LAW AND EQurry UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

9.03[4], at 9-27

(1985). Others have added to this definition, stating that in order for a seller to have lost volume,
he must show that the second sale would have been profitable. See R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v.

Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 1987).
The "unlimited" supply requirement has troubled some commentators because no supplier

literally has an unlimited supply of goods.

See Comment, A Theoretical Postscript:

Microecomonics and the Lost-Volume Seller, 24 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 712, 717 (1973). While I
recognize that every seller's supply must necessarily be finite, I do not mean unlimited in a literal

sense. Rather, when I say "unlimited," I mean "virtually unlimited."
4. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1994). This section reads:

If [market damages are] inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as
performance would have done then the measure of damages is the profit (including
reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance by

the buyer ... [with] due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for
payments or proceeds of resale.
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708(2), which obligates the seller to give "due credit for the payment
and proceeds of resale" to the buyer.5 If the lost volume seller resells
the goods for the same price, the "due credit" language has been argued
to preclude the seller from realizing two profits. However, notwithstanding the "due credit" language, 6 the lost volume seller concept has
been overwhelmingly endorsed by commentators, beginning with a
series of articles written by Professor Robert Harris in the early 1960s.7
Brushing aside the "due credit" language as a drafting error, some proponents of the lost volume seller have thereby reconstrued section 2708(2) to ignore the "due credit" language to specifically address the
lost volume seller. 8
Since 1972, 9 the courts have likewise embraced the lost volume
concept by regularly and repeatedly awarding lost profits to volume sellers under section 2-708(2) despite the "due credit" language. 10 So over5. Id.
6. See, e.g., I ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS §§ 2.6-.9 (4th
ed. 1992); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 7-9 to 7-10,

7-13 to 7-14 (4th ed. 1995); Roy Ryden Anderson, Damages for Sellers Under the Code's Profit
Formula, 40 Sw. LJ. 1021 (1986); Robert Childres & Robert K. Burgess, Seller's Remedies: The
Primacyof UCC 2-708(2), 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 833 (1973); William L. Schlosser, Construing UCC
Section 2-708(2) to Apply to the Lost-Volume Seller, 24 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 686 (1973)
[hereinafter Schlosser, Construing]; William L. Schlosser, Damagesfor the Lost-Volume Seller:
Does an Efficient Formula Already Exist?, 17 UCC L.J. 238 (1985) [hereinafter Schlosser,
Efficient Formula];John A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code: An Agenda for Review, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 360 (1981); Note, Seller's Recovery of Lost
Profits for Breach of a Sales Contract: Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-708(2), 11 Wm.
Mrrcnm.L L. REv. 227 (1985). For commentary on the economics of the lost volume seller, see,
e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Measuring Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle,
31 STAN. L. REV. 323 (1979); Victor P. Goldberg, An Economic Analysis of the Lost-Volume
Retail Seller, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 283 (1984); Comment, A Theoretical Postscript:
Microeconomics and the Lost-Volume Seller, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 712 (1973).

7. See Robert J. Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act
and Commercial Code Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REv. 66 (1965) [hereinafter Harris, Seller's
Damages]; Robert J. Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's Damagesfor Total Breach
of Contract, 60 MICH. L. REv. 577 (1962); Robert J. Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of
Seller's Damages: Michigan Results Compared,61 MICH. L. REv. 849 (1963); Robert J. Harris,
A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: New York Results Compared, 34
FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (1965); Robert J. Harris & Kenneth Graham, A Radical Restatement of the
Law of Seller's Damages: California Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REv. 553 (1966).
8. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 7-13, at 274-76.

9. See Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972).
10. See, e.g., R.E. Davis Chem. Corp., 924 F.2d at 683; Tri-State Petroleum Corp. v. Saber
Energy, Inc., 845 F.2d 575, 580-81 (5th Cir. 1988); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771
F.2d 1279, 1290 (9th Cit. 1985), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 957 (1986); Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne
Indus., Inc., 676 F.2d 865, 868-70 (1st Cir. 1982); TCP Indus., Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542
(6th Cir. 1981); Nederlandse Draadindustrie NDI B.V. v. Grand Pre-Stressed Corp., 466 F. Supp.
846 (E.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 614 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1979); Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc.,
493 F.2d 251, 253-54 (4th Cir. 1974); Comeq, Inc. v. Mitternight Boiler Works, Inc., 456 So. 2d
264, 267-69 (Ala. 1984); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Indus., Inc., 696 P.2d 1330, 1339-40 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1984); National Controls, Inc. v. Commodore Business Machines, Inc., 209 Cal. Rptr.
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whelming was the support for the lost volume seller that the issue of
whether the lost volume seller should or should not receive lost profits
seemed to be conclusively settled for over two decades." In fact, most
of the commentary and litigation on the lost volume issue in the past
decade has centered not on whether the lost volume concept should
exist, but rather upon the proper formula or measure of damages once
the seller has been identified as a lost volume seller.'"
Following years of dormancy, Professor John Breen recently resurrected the lost volume conceptual debate in an article wherein he swings
a hefty academic attack on the lost volume seller doctrine and its attendant award of two profits.' 3 In Professor Breen's view, the "due credit"
language of section 2-708(2) should be read literally.' 4 In support of his
proposition, Professor Breen argues that the UCC's drafters included the
5
"due credit" language specifically to preclude lost volume claims.'
While Professor Breen admits that the lost volume concept may at first
blush appear commonsensical, he nonetheless contends that a thorough
analysis shows that the lost volume concept is flawed and repugnant to
16
the rule of expectancy damages in that it overcompensates the seller.
My analysis is in response to Professor Breen's invitation to reexamine
the lost volume debate. I respectfully dissent.
I take the position that the drafters did not say credit for the payments and proceeds of resale, but "due credit." In other words, "due
credit" relates to "proper credit." That is, costs incurred in a sale saved
by breach should be incorporated into the calculus of determining lost
profit. Salvage value is one such cost. In other words, damages should
reflect fair due credit to the breaching buyer as well as fair recovery for
the seller. Having committed no wrong, the seller has had his lawfully
contracted for profit wrongfully denied. It is the breach in the context of
contractual rights and wrongs into which the law steps. In the philosophical approach of the Code, the law should fashion a remedy which
puts the aggrieved party in as good a position as if the breaching party
7
had performed.'
636 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum and Assoc., Inc., 380 A.2d 618, 624-27
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
11. Prior to 1996, the last commentary to seriously attack the validity of the lost volume seller
occurred in 1973. See Morris G. Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of UCC Section 2708(2) (One Profit for the Reseller), 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 697 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Schlosser, Efficient Formula, supra note 6, at 244-61.
13. John M. Breen, The Lost Volume Seller and Lost Profits Under U.C.C. § 2-708(2): A

Conceptual and Linguistic Critique, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 779 (1996).
14. Breen, supra note 13, at 786-89.
15. Id. at 844-46.
16. Id. at 785-86, 827-30.
17. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1994). Section 1-106(1) instructs courts that remedies "shall be
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Like Professor Breen, I wish to read the Code literally and consistent with the realistic commercial milieu in which it was forged. Had
the drafters intended to credit the breaching buyer with the proceeds of
the aggrieved seller's resale, it is my position that they would have said
so. Instead, the drafters spoke of "due credit," meaning credit given as
appropriate under the factual circumstances. Hence, the various remedies available under the Code are all guided by the principle of fair
remediation set down in UCC § 1-106's admonition to construe the law
toward the end of putting aggrieved parties in as good a position as if
there had been no breach.
The purpose of this article is to accept Professor Breen's offer to
reopen the discussion of the lost volume seller started by Professor Harris over thirty years ago, and to close it. This article discusses both the
etiology of the lost volume doctrine and whether the doctrine is conceptually valid. At the same time, this article addresses and responds to the
questions and issues raised by Professor Breen's article. In particular,
this article examines whether the lost volume seller suffers the economic
harm of a lost profit to which the seller is entitled. Determining the
calculation of damages is an accounting issue and beyond the scope of
this article.
Part I of this article focuses on the Pre-Code case law that
addressed lost volume cases with either common law principles or using
the Uniform Sales Act. Part II of the article examines and discusses the
legislative and drafting history behind section 2-708(2). Finally, Part III
determines whether the lost volume doctrine is a rational, conceptually
sound concept consistent with fairness and reasonable commercial
expectancies.
II.

LOST VOLUME CASES AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE
UNIFORM SALES ACT

A.

The "Preference"for Market Measured Damages: Does It
Exist?

Since Professor Harris coined the term "lost volume seller" over
thirty years ago, several commentators have written on the subject, the
overwhelming majority of whom have written in its favor.1 8 Surprisingly, in every article concerning lost volume, there has been very little
discourse concerning the treatment of lost volume claims at common
law and under the Uniform Sales Act. The discussion that has taken
liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed... " Id.
18. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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place has been brief and often superficial. 19 Conclusions concerning the
common law position have been inconsistent, with some claiming that
the majority rule was to grant lost profits to lost volume sellers.2 0 Conversely, others have argued that the majority of cases clearly denied lost
profits to would be volume sellers. 2 ' Professor Breen, an advocate of
this latter view, states that common law courts routinely denied lost
profits to sellers, thereby limiting a seller's damages to the contractmarket differential. 22 Furthermore, Professor Breen maintains that lost
profit damages were so rare and unusual at common law that the lost
volume concept could not have been the common law majority rule.23
While the majority of reported cases may have indicated a preference for market damages over lost profit, such a fact is irrelevant to the
concept of the lost volume seller. In today's era of recognition and
endorsement of the lost volume seller, the majority of courts still prefer
market damages for sellers where appropriate.24 This is true given that
few sellers are able to meet the burden of proving lost volume seller
status. 25 Therefore, the argument over whether common law courts preferred market damages over lost profits is not relevant to the issue being
examined here. Instead, the argument should focus on the common law
view pertaining to sellers who are lost volume sellers, not sellers in
general.
As to the common law majority rule with regard to sellers who are
lost volume sellers, Professor Breen claims that the common law courts
rejected the two profit argument and preferred to award market damages
instead.26 An examination of the cases cited by Professor Breen reveals
that while the cases strictly adhered to the market damages general rule,
19. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 330 (stating that common law courts were
skeptical of lost volume claims and thus preferred market measured damages); Anderson, supra
note 6, at 1025 (noting that the profit remedy was rarely applied at common law).
20. See, e.g., 1 DUNN, supra note 6, § 2.9, at 102 ("Even cases under the Uniform Sales Act
and prior common law consistently permitted recovery of lost profits damages when a buyer from
a reseller breached the contract of sale"); Schlosser, Construing, supra note 6, at 686-87 (citing
Professor Corbin for the proposition that pre-Code contract law applied the lost volume concept).
21. See, e.g., Breen, supra note 13, at 856-57; Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 330.
22. Breen, supra note 13, at 856-57.
23. Id. at 856-57, 862.
24. 3 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES, § 2-708:04 (1994)
(stating that market damages "usually will result in a recovery that equals the value of the seller's

bargain").
25. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.10, at 890 & n.19 (1990).
Professor Farnsworth notes that some suppliers attempt to reach an optimal volume whereby they
will not enter additional contracts once this optimal volume is achieved. Id. For this reason,
Professor Farnsworth notes that courts place the burden of proving lost volume on the aggrieved
seller. Id. (citations omitted).
26. Breen, supra note 13, at 862 & n.341.
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the sellers in the cases are not in fact lost volume sellers.27 I am, therefore, left unconvinced by Professor Breen's assertion that the lost volume doctrine flies in the face of establishing common law principles.
B.

Instances Where "Due Credit" was Given at Common Law

The discussion as to whether the proper measure of a seller's damages should be market measured or lost profit is of questionable significance. Arguably, the origin of the "due credit" may not pertain to the
proper measure of damages, rather reflecting the drafters' concern over
mitigation and the doctrine of avoidable consequences. The common
law rule concerning substituted contracts was very simple. As a general
rule, the injured party must deduct from his damages-give due credit to
the breaching party-the gains made from subsequent contracts after
breach.28 This general rule, however, was subject to one very important
exception and qualification. If the substituted contract would have been
entered into regardless of the breach, then "due credit" for the second
transaction should not be considered. 29 This rule was promulgated in
the first Restatement of Contracts, which states that "[g]ains made by the
27. See id. The first case cited by Professor Breen for his proposition, W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Nagle, 275 F. 343 (2d Cir. 1921), involved a contract whereby the plaintiff agreed to turn steel
slabs provided by the defendant into steel plates, and once finished, the plaintiff would sell the
steel plates back to the defendant. Upon the defendant's failure to supply the remaining 400 slabs
to the plaintiff for processing, the plaintiff sued. The Second Circuit awarded the plaintiff
damages based on the contract-market differential. Because the defendant was the supplier of the
slabs, the plaintiff did not have an unlimited supply of slabs to process into plates. Therefore, the
plaintiff could not be a lost volume seller. Accordingly, Professor Breen's reliance upon the case
is misplaced, as is his citation to Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.,
143 N.E. 312 (Mass. 1924), which dealt with the issue of whether the seller should be limited to
lost profits when the anticipated profits were considerably lower than the contract-market
differential. This case is immaterial, since if market damages are adequate, the issue of lost profits
is no longer an issue. The entire lost volume concept is premised on the fact that market damages
for a volume seller are inadequate.
A third case cited for Professor Breen's position, Kincaid v. Price, 70 P. 153 (Colo. Ct. App.
1902), dealt with a buyer's breach of an output contract with the seller. To declare that a seller
who contracts to sell his entire output is a potential lost volume seller is absurd. Because the
seller's entire output is to go to the buyer, the seller afortioricannot qualify for the lost volume
seller's unlimited supply requirement.
In two other cases cited by Breen, Centennial Electric Co. v. Morse, 116 N.E. 901 (Mass.
1917), and Frederick v. Willoughby, 116 S.W. 1109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1909), nothing in the facts
show that either seller had a supply of goods greater than the demand for the product. The
remaining cases are all automobile cases, which, along with the industry, speak for themselves.
See Charles St. Garage Co. v. Kaplan, 45 N.E.2d 928 (Mass. 1942); Babbitt v. Wides Motor Sales
Corp., 192 N.Y.S.2d 21 (N.Y. App. Term 1959); Lowas Garage Co. v Scheer, 199 N.Y.S. 748
(App. Term 1923); Varley v. Belford, 156 N.Y.S. 597 (App. Term 1916).
28. See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs § 336 cmt. c (1932); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. f, § 350 cmt. d (1981); 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRAcrs § 1039, at 246-47, § 1041, at 256-60, § 1100, at 541-42 (1964).
29. See id.
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injured party on other transactions after breach are never to be deducted
from the damages that are otherwise recoverable unless such gains could
not have been made had there been no breach." 3° Such a maxim was
31
applicable to all types of contracts, including employment contracts,
construction contracts, 32 leases, 33 franchise agreements, 34 as well as
sales. With regard to sales, the Restatement specifically adopts and
endorses the lost volume concept by stating:
[s]pecific goods cannot be sold twice; therefore their market value
obtainable on another sale is deducted. But manufacturing facilities
can usually be expanded to meet all demands; therefore profit made
on the manufacture and sale of a second article is not deducted. And
the same is true in the case of a contract to sell a non-specific article,
of which the supply in the market is not limited.35
Case law supports the Restatement's position. In fact, when faced
with lost volume seller situations, common law courts and courts interpreting the Uniform Sales Act repeatedly cited the Restatement in
awarding profits to volume sellers. For example, in Wilhelm Lubrica3 6 the Minnesota
tion Co. v. Brattrud,
Supreme Court considered whether

the plaintiff-seller's damages should be reduced by a subsequent contract to sell the subject matter goods to another buyer. Noting that the
seller had a large supply of goods and many contracts similar to the one
in the case, the court held that the subsequent sale of the goods was
irrelevant to the seller's damages.37 The court reasoned that the buyer's
breach "merely mean[t] the loss of one sale and the profit that plaintiff
would have received thereby. ' 38
Likewise, in Mossy Motors v. McRedmond,39 the Court of Appeal
of Louisiana recognized the limits of the general rule that the subsequent
30. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336 cmt. c (1932). See also 5 CORBIN, supra note 28,
§ 1041, at 256.
31. See Canton-Hughes Pump Co. v. Llera, 205 F. 209 (6th Cir. 1913); Benziger v. Miller, 50
Ala. 206 (1873); Palm v. Planada Dev. Corp., 167 P. 381 (Cal. 1917); Perry v. Simpson

Waterproof Mfg. Co., 37 Conn. 520 (1871); Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co., 85 N.E. 877
(Mass. 1908); Howard v. Daly, 61 N.Y. 362 (1875). But see Farmers' Fertilizer Co. v. Lillie, 18

F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1927) (holding that no credit should be given for second contract where the
employee has been wrongfully discharged).
32. See Ross v. Columbus Mining Co., 264 S.W. 1071 (Ky. 1924); Sides v. Contemporary
Homes, Inc., 311 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958). See also Grinnell Co. v. Voorhees, 1 F.2d 693
(3d Cir. 1924) (applying the common law rule but arguably making the wrong decision).
33. See Locks v. Wade, 114 A.2d 875 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955).
34. See Willred Co. v. Westmoreland Metal Mfg. Co., 200 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
35. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs § 336 cmt. c (1932).
36. 268 N.W. 634 (Minn. 1936).
37. Brattrud, 268 N.W. at 637.
38. Id.
39. 12 So. 2d 719 (La. Ct. App. 1943).
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contract be used to deduct the seller's damages. In discussing the general rule the court stated,
[w]here it is applied in the case of a single article it may produce a
fair result, but if applied in the case of a merchant which is regularly
engaged in selling similar things, and where there is an unlimited
supply and a limited market, surely it is easy to see that an unfair
result would often be reached by its application.4"
In addition to awarding lost profits to lost volume sellers, the PreCode courts also turned to the Restatement rule to justify the reduction
of the sellers' damages by giving due credit to a buyer's subsequent
sales contract. In such cases, the seller did not have an unlimited supply
of goods, and thus could not qualify as a lost volume seller. An illustration of this proposition is Ed S. Michelson, Inc. v. Nebraska Tire &
Rubber Co.41 In Michelson, the plaintiff-seller sued the buyer for refusing to accept 10,000 tires. Upon repudiation, the plaintiff sold the tires
to a substitute buyer for the same price as the original contract. Crucial
to the outcome of the case was that the plaintiff was a middleman who
had contracted with a supplier to purchase only 10,000 tires per month.42
Thus, the plaintiff had only a limited supply and was not a lost volume
seller. As such, the court limited the plaintiffs damages to one profit.
The court reasoned that to award the plaintiff profits on the contract
would be to award the plaintiff "two profits out of a contract that guaranteed it but one, and it would be very substantially better off because of
the breach of the contract than it would have been had the contract been
literally carried out."43
The Michelson case is an important illustration of the misapplication of the general rule. The error was compounded in BergerMfg.Co.
v. PhillipsHotel Operating Co.' In Berger, the plaintiff-seller claimed
entitlement to lost profits despite a subsequent sale of the goods to a
second buyer. In justifying the lost profit remedy, the plaintiff put forth
the lost volume argument, contending that it had an unlimited supply of
goods and, therefore, would have consummated the second contract anyway.4 5 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument, noting that the plaintiff failed to cite any authority for its position.' In finding that the
plaintiff was fully compensated by the resale, the court cited Michelson
for the proposition that the plaintiff should not receive two profits for the
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 721.
63 F.2d 597 (8th Cir. 1933).
See id. at 598.
Id. at 601.
89 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935).
See id. at 706.
See id.
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sale of one article.47 What the court failed to recognize was that the
seller in Michelson had a limited supply of goods, whereas the seller's
supply in Berger was unlimited. For this reason, the Berger decision
should be regarded as an aberration, simply wrongfully decided based
on blind adherence to the general rule of mitigation thereby ignoring the
exception.
In terms of mitigation, the "due credit" language appears to make
more sense. Wilhelm Lubrication,Mossy Motors, Michelson, and Berger are important to show that the issue of the lost volume seller is not
solely one of market damages versus lost profits. Viewed in this context, the "due credit" language is arguably an expression of the general
rule of mitigation with the failure to promulgate the exception. While
one may argue ad nauseam as to exactly what the majority position may
have been regarding the lost volume seller at common law, the Restatement, coupled with the above cases, provides ample support for the
notion that Pre-Code case law was willing to endorse the doctrine.
III.
A.

DRAFTING AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UCC

Using the Drafting History to Give Meaning to the "Due Credit"
Language

The following provides an overview of the role that the drafting
history of the UCC played in the lost volume debate. This analysis is
not meant to be exhaustive of all arguments concerning the importance
of the drafting history as it relates to the lost volume seller. Instead, this
analysis is confined to the main focus in the lost volume debate, that is,
the quest to discover the true meaning of the language "due allowance
for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments and proceeds
of resale. 48
Both advocates and opponents of the lost volume seller doctrine
point to the drafting history behind this particular phrase in order to
promote and justify their respective positions. Advocates of the doctrine
have used the drafting history to explain the "due credit" language in
order to justify ignoring such language when applying section 2-708 to
the lost volume seller.4 9 In particular, the advocates point to the first
appearance of the "due allowance" and "due credit" language of section
2-708 in the 1954 Recommendations of the Enlarged Editorial Board.
This change in the text was accompanied by a comment explaining that
47. See id.
48. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1994).
49. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 7-13, at 275 ("Gross errors of the kind here

committed by the drafters call for extraordinary solutions. ...courts should simply ignore the
'due credit' language in lost volume cases."); Harris, Seller's Damages, supra note 7, at 99, 101.

1997]

LOST VOLUME SELLER: RESPONSE TO PROF. BREEN

1205

"[t]he main purpose of the change is ...to clarify the privilege of the

seller to realize junk value when it is manifestly useless to complete the
operation of manufacture." 50 This particular comment is critical because
the advocates have used this piece of drafting history as ammunition for
their cause in demonstrating that the "due credit" language was never
intended to apply to lost Volume situations.51 Instead, in the proponents'
eyes, the "due credit" language was only intended to address the scenario where the buyer's repudiation occurs while the seller is still in the
process of manufacturing the goodS. 52 In the advocates' opinion, the
"due allowance" and "due credit" language of section 2-708 "works like
a charm" when applied to a situation where the seller has unfinished
goods.53 Conversely, when finished and completed goods are involved,
the "due allowance" and "due credit" language is senseless.5 4 Therefore, the advocates have justified disregard of the "due credit" language
based on the drafting history instead of solely basing their argument for
ignoring the text to avoid absurd results.
In Professor Breen's view, the proponents are guilty of examining
the drafting history through tinted glasses, placing a brief portion of the
drafting history under a microscope, and thereby failing to see the big
picture.5 5 In support of his proposition, Professor Breen seeks to establish a more thorough analysis of the drafting history of Article 2. When
viewing the drafting history as a whole, Professor Breen concludes that
the drafters specifically drafted section 2-708 with the intention that it be
applied literally to preclude lost volume claims.56 In Breen's view, by
focusing on a small part of the history of section 2-708 only, the advocates have failed to recognize the significance of other Code sections
which may have an impact on the lost volume problem. In particular,
Breen criticizes the advocates for ignoring the drafting history behind
section 2-703.17 Simply stated, section 2-703 is the index of the seller's
50. Further Recommendations of the Enlarged Editorial Board for Amendments of Text and
Answers to Certain Criticisms (1954) [hereinafter 1954 RECOMMENDA-IONS].

51. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 6,

§ 7-9,

at

262-64 (quoting

1954

RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 14); Sebert, supra note 6, at 394 n.146 (arguing that the

accompanying reason to section 2-708(2) lends "some support in the drafting history of § 2708(2) for ignoring the costs and proceeds language in the context of a lost volume seller."); Note,
Seller's Recovery of Lost Profits for Breach of a Sales Contract: Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-708(2), 11 Wm.MrrcHmLL L. REv. 227, 239, 245-47 (contending that the legislative
history indicates that a literal reading of section 2-708(2) is not intended to apply to lost volume
sellers but is only applicable to a components seller who ceases manufacture after breach).
52. See sources cited supra note 51.
53. WHrE & SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 7-13, at 401.
54. See sources cited supra note 51.
55. See Breen, supra note 1, at 818, 844.
56. See id. at 844-45.
57. See id. at 870, 882.
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remedies, informing the seller which remedies are available, and
directing the seller to a specific remedial section. Under earlier drafts of
section 2-703(e) and its precursors, as a precondition to seeking relief
under section 2-708 for either market damages or profit, the seller must
not have resold the goods. 8 If the goods were resold, then the seller
was limited to a remedy under section 2-706, under which the seller's
damages are measured by the contract price-resale price differential.
Given that the lost volume seller makes a resale, Breen argues that the
drafters clearly intended that the lost volume seller not enjoy the benefits
of the section 2-708 remedy.59 Accordingly, because the reselling
seller's damages are to be limited to the contract-resale differential,
Breen contends the drafters demonstrated their intent that the60lost volume seller was to be fully compensated with only one profit.
Another reason for the importance of section 2-703(e) is that, in
Breen's opinion, the advocates have failed to recognize its significance
in formulating a mistaken assumption that the "due allowance" and "due
credit" language is merely a clarification to be applied only when dealing with unfinished goods.6 ' Consequently, the advocates argue that the
"due allowance" and "due credit" language is meaningless and should be
disregarded in the context of finished goods. 62 Breen concedes that the
"due allowance" and "due credit" language was intended to be a clarification that section 2-708(2) afford a lost profit remedy to sellers of
unfinished products. However, Breen's main criticism of the advocates'
position is that the necessary corollary of this clarification is that "due
allowance" and "due credit" have no bearing on awarding lost profits to
sellers of finished goods, namely, lost volume sellers. Breen explains
that the advocates have failed to recognize that, pursuant to section 2703(e), the seller who makes a resale was not entitled to the profit remedy in the first place.63 Therefore, in Breen's opinion, the addition of
the "due allowance" and "due credit" language was intended to be an
exception to the general rule that the profit remedy and resale were to be
mutually exclusive. 6 1 Moreover, Breen argues that had the drafters
resell
intended the profit remedy to be available to those sellers who
65
so.
said
have
would
certainly
finished goods, the drafters most
That there be no resale of the goods as a condition to application of
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. at 870-75.
See id. at 870.
See id.
Id. at 882.
See notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
See Breen, supra note 13, at 882.
See id. at 882.
See id. at 881.
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section 2-708 was eliminated in the 1956 Recommendations and is not
part of the current Code.66 The stated reason for the elimination of the
no resale language was to dispel concerns over election of remedies particularly between section 2-706 and section 2-708.67 In acknowledging
that the advocates could argue that the elimination of the no resale condition demonstrates a willingness of the drafters to open the door to
section 2-708 for lost volume sellers of finished goods, Breen attempts
to refute this argument by claiming that the elimination of the no resale
language had nothing to do with lost volume claims.68 In support of his
proposition, Breen asserts that the no resale condition was deleted over
the concerns raised by Professor John Honnold's analysis of section 2703.69 Breen argues that Honnold's main concern was that the seller
could be precluded from any relief, if, for instance, the seller failed to
comply with one of the requirements of section 2-706. Comment 2 of
section 2-706 stated that if there was an improper resale of the goods, for
example, for failing to notify the breaching buyer or failing to identify
the goods to the contract, then the seller's damages should be measured
under section 2-708. Given that the seller has made a resale, the no
resale condition of section 2-703(e) to application of section 2-708 was
internally inconsistent with Comment 2 of section 2-706. Thus, Honnold recommended the elimination of the no resale condition in order to
harmonize Comment 2 of section 2-706 and section 2-703(e). According to Breen, Honnold's only concern was that the seller who improperly
resells the goods under section 2-706 should at least be afforded market
measured damages, prescribed in section 2-708(1).70 Honnold's silence
concerning the lost profit remedy led Breen to infer that the deletion of
the no resale language was not meant to allow the lost volume seller to
freely elect to have his damages measured by section 2-708(2). Rather,
Breen stresses that the logical inference is that the no resale condition be
retained in lost volume situations. Thus, according to Breen, the deletion of the no resale condition prohibits the advocates of the lost volume
seller from arguing in good faith "that the drafters were in fact attempt71
ing to remove the last 'linguistic impediment' to lost volume claims.
The Overemphasis of the Drafting History to Solve the Lost
Volume Problem
In support for his criticism of the lost volume seller, Breen chas-

B.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id. at 887.
See id. at 887-88, 894.
See id. at 888.
See id. at 895-97.
See id. at 895.
Id. at 897.
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tises the advocates for having their reasoning clouded by their belief that
the lost volume seller ought to receive two profits.72 In particular, Breen
argues that this faulty reasoning is most evident in the advocates'
attempt to justify their view by focusing on the limited drafting history
which, when viewed alone, appears to support their proposition.73
Nonetheless, Breen is equally guilty by leaving the reader unconvinced
that his view of the drafting history dispels any doubt that the drafters
specifically intended to preclude lost volume claims. Breen's emphasis
on the interrelation between sections 2-703(e) and 2-708 is at best circumstantial. For instance, his own analysis of the drafting history notes
Professor Honnold's concern over the inconsistency between section 2703(e) and Comment 2 of section 2-706. 74 This shows, if anything, that
Article 2 is not a perfect instrument and that inconsistencies are inevitable. Hence, Breen's judgment, like that of the advocates, may be
equally clouded by the preconceived notion that the lost volume seller
ought not receive two profits.
In all the evidence presented by the advocates and the opponents of
the lost volume seller, there seems to be mere inference that the lost
volume doctrine should or should not be endorsed. In no way does any
of the evidence allude directly to the lost volume concept. For instance,
Breen infers from the drafting history that since the no resale condition
of section 2-703(e) precluded application of the section 2-708 profit
remedy, the drafters must have specifically intended to limit lost volume
claims.75 If the drafters' true intent was to preclude lost volume claims,
then this section certainly would have been a strange way of expressing
it. It seems inconceivable that the drafters could have so strongly
opposed lost volume claims yet have failed to provide any direct comment to that effect. Furthermore, the advocates have likewise referred to
the "due credit" comment language to infer that such language not apply
where the seller resells finished goods.76 What remains as fact is that
neither the advocates nor the opponents have provided the "smoking
gun" that would bring the debate to a clear and convincing end. Therefore, it seems equally plausible that the drafters never contemplated the
lost volume seller.77 .
72. See id. at 878-79.
73. See id. at 880.
74. See id. at 895.
75. See id. at 882-83.
76. See sources cited supra note 51.
77. See also, STEWART MACAULEY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 72-74 (1995). The
authors give an excellent overview of the drafting history of section 2-708(2). With regard to the
addition of the "due credit" language, the authors propose the following explanation:
Why wasn't this unfortunate change spotted and revoked? One can only guess, but
a guess might be suggested by the fact that a blizzard of changes were proposed by
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Support for the above proposition appears in the various writings of
the Code's principal drafter and chief architect, Karl Llewellyn. In fact,
Llewellyn admitted quite candidly that "[b]orderline, doubtful, or uncontemplated cases are inevitable." 78 For this reason, there is no indication
that Llewellyn intended the Code to be applied as rigidly and as literally
as Breen would seem to suggest. Because the Code was intended to be
semi-permanent legislation, with revisions coming every thirty to fifty
years, Llewellyn's idea was that the Code, in order to be effective,
needed to grant flexibility for judges to tailor decisions in accordance
with changing technological and economic conditions.79 In his book on
Llewellyn, William Twining argues that Llewellyn Code philosophy
was a response to the Continental Codes of the 19th Century, which,
when drafted, were believed to instill social change, but were too rigidly
constructed such that they ended up as barriers to change. 0 In response,
Llewellyn specifically drafted Article 1 to reflect his own philosophy of
the Code."' Indeed, Article 1 is quite unique in that section 1-102(1)
makes liberal, as opposed to literal, construction mandatory.82 To assure
uniformity despite mandatory liberal interpretation, Llewellyn believed
that each statute should display on its face its underlying policies and
purposes. By doing so, the courts would avoid giving the statute a
"wooden and literal meaning. 83 Thus, Llewellyn foresaw that when
future courts faced with situations "utterly uncontemplated" by the statute could use the statute's underlying purposes and policies to make
"sense ...of [the statute] in the light of the new situation." 84
Having determined that Llewellyn intended the Code to be interpreted in accordance with its underlying policies, the next step is to
determine the underlying policies behind section 2-708(2). In section 2the New York Law Revision Commission around this time and that also at this time

the legislature of New York rejected the Code in a form without these changes.
New York's rejection and the Commission's proposals precipitated a crisis resolved
only through extended and intermittently fierce debates. In this circumstance, § 2708(2), which had been approved by the N.Y. Law Revision Commission and which
had so little pretension to do anything beyond restating 'standard law,' probably
received little attention.

Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
78. WiLiAm TWINING, KARL LtLEWELN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 322 (1973) (quoting

Karl N. Llewellyn Papers § (J)(VI)(I)(e), at 5 (1944)).
79. See id. at 305.
80. See id.
81. See generally John L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 378-83 (1988).
82. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1994). Section 1-102(1) states that "[t]his Act shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies." Id.
83. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 400 (1950).

84. Id. at 400.
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708's accompanying Comment 2, the drafters make a vague reference
that the profit remedy should be awarded "in all appropriate cases" in
the case of fixed or standard priced goods.8" While it is unclear whether
the drafters of the Comment were specifically addressing lost volume
sellers, it clearly demonstrates that market measured damages are inadequate in the case of standard priced goods. What the drafters failed to
articulate is an understanding of how to calculate the lost profit, leaving
that aspect of the lost volume problem unanswered. Therefore, it is necessary to look elsewhere in the Code for applicable policy and purpose
considerations.
Of particular guidance is section 1-106, which reflects Llewellyn's
view that remedial statutes be "liberally administered. 81 6 Section 1-106
emphasizes that, in liberally construing remedial statutes, one should not
lose sight of the Code's policy to "put [the aggrieved party] in as good a
position as if the other party had fully performed. 87 While the application of section 1-106 appears simple on its face, the practical utilization
of the section has been much harder, because both sides of the lost volume seller debate have used section 1-106 to support their own positions. That is, the advocates point to section 1-106 to justify their belief
that the lost volume seller is undercompensated by section 2-708(2)
because, had the buyer fully performed, the seller would have enjoyed
two profits. 88 Conversely, critics of the lost volume doctrine contend
that a literal reading of section 2-708(2) is consistent with the normative
principle of section 1-106 in that the lost volume seller would be
overcompensated by anything more than one profit. 89 In the final analysis, however, since the lost volume seller was uncontemplated by the
drafters, section 1-106 indicates the debate should be less concerned
with the Code's drafting history. Instead, the battle should be a dispute
over the conceptual validity of the lost volume seller. This is particularly important given the recent actions of the Permanent Editorial Board
concerning the revision of Article 2, which forms the discussion of the
following subsection.

85. U.C.C. § 2-708 cmt. 2 (1994). Comment 2 states that § 2-708(2) is "designed to
eliminate the unfair and economically wasteful results arising under the older law when fixed
price articles were involved. This section permits the recovery of lost profits in all appropriate
cases, which would include all standard priced goods." Id.
86. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1994).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., RAY D. HENSON, T-m LAW OF SALES § 7.04, at 285 (1985) (stating that "a
straightforward reading of [section 1-106] ...should solve most problems [of lost volume]
without undue difficulty").
89. See Breen, supra note 13, at 910-11.
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C. Current Revision of Article 2: Is ProfessorBreen's Discussion of
the Original Drafting Rendered Moot?
1.

THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY GROUP AND TASK FORCE

In 1988, the Permanent Editorial Board assigned a Study Group to
make an appraisal of Article 2.90 In its revisions and recommendations
to Article 2 published in 1990, the Study Group concluded that the "due
allowance" and "due credit" language should be scrapped. 9 Regarding
section 2-708(2), the Study Group concluded, "[t]his measure of damages, because it focuses only on lost profits, should not contain the language, now in § 2-708(2), 'due allowance for costs reasonably incurred
and due credit for payments and proceeds of resale."' 92 In 1991, the
Task Force assembled by the American Bar Association examined the
Study Group's Preliminary Report and agreed with the Study Group's
recommendation that93the "due credit" language be dropped in the next
revision of Article 2.
Although Breen addresses this recommendation of the Study
Group, he is quick to downplay its significance. Noting that the Study
Group gave little explanation for its recommendation, Breen criticizes
the Study Group for merely assuming, based of the great weight of
authority of case law, that the lost volume doctrine is valid.94 In Breen's
opinion, if the Study Group were only aware of the drafting history of
section 2-708(2), they would understand that the intent of the original
drafters in utilizing the "due credit" language was to preclude lost volume claims. 95 As demonstrated earlier, Breen has not shown in a clear
and convincing way that this is true. However, even supposing Breen is
correct in his view of the drafting history, this has nothing to do with
whether the drafters were right (or thorough). The very purpose of the
Permanent Editorial Board is to revise the inadequacies of the Code in
order to align the Code with what the law should be, given the ever
changing legal and commercial climate. Attitudes and views change
from generation to generation, and something which may have been
right for an older generation may not be right for successive generations.
It is upon this premise that the Permanent Editorial Board has every
right to change a particular section of the Code which they find absurd
or unfit. Because the "due credit" language seems destined for extinc90. See PEB Study Group Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 - Preliminary Report (1990).
91. See Note, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 1221 (1991).
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1224.
94. See Breen, supra note 13, at 902.

95. See id. at 902-03.
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tion, the focus of the debate should zoom in on the conceptual validity of
the lost volume concept itself. Only then may we determine whether the
actions of the Permanent Editorial Board are justified.
2.

THE AUGUST

1994

AND SUBSEQUENT REVISIONS OF ARTICLE

2

After analyzing the finding of the Study Group and the Task Force,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in
August 1994, gave the first reading of the revised Article 2.96 The
revised version of section 2-708(2), now renumbered 2-708(b), reads as
follows:
(b) Subject to Section 2-701(e), a seller may recover damages measured by other than market price including:
(1) lost profits, including reasonable overhead, resulting from the
breach determined in any reasonable manner, together with incidental
and consequential damages under Section 2-710, less expenses
avoided as a result of the buyer's breach; and
(2) reasonable expenditures made in preparing for or performing the
contract if, after the breach, the seller is unable to obtain reimbursement by salvage, resale, or other reasonable measures.97
If adopted, the revised section 2-708(b) will no longer be subject to dispute over the proper meaning of the legislative intent, let alone the
words "due credit."
In addition to the revision of section 2-708, the revision of section
2-701 is also especially noteworthy. Section 2-701(c), which addresses
remedies in general, is a virtual restatement of section 1-106, mandating
the liberal interpretation of the remedial statutes.98 In its proposed form,
section 2-701(c) states:
(c) The remedies provided by this article must be liberally administered to put the aggrieved party in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed. If those remedies fail to place the
aggrieved party in the position, the court may award damages measured by the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the
breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable. 99

Since August 1994, Article 2 has undergone several more revisions,
none of which has substantially changed either section 2-708(b) or section 2-701 of the August 1994 draft." U These more recent revisions
96. Richard E. Speidel & James J. White, The Emerging Article 2: Remedies for Breach of
the Contractfor Sale, C965 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 33, 35 (1994).

97. Id. at 50.
98. Id. at 47.
99. Id.
100. At the time of compiling this article, the latest draft of Article 2, dated January 24, 1997,
renumbered sections 2-708(b) and 2-701(c) of the August 1994 draft to sections 2-821(b) and 2-
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show that section 1-106 is destined to supremacy over all specific remedial statutes. As already stated, this section has been used by advocates
and opponents alike to support their respective positions. Hence, it is
time to analyze in what position the seller would be had the buyer fully
performed-whether it be one profit, two profits, or somewhere in
between.
IV.

A.

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE LOST VOLUME SELLER

Responses to the Arguments Against the Lost Volume Seller
1.

THE MITIGATION ARGUMENT

One argument used to discredit the lost volume seller concept is
that it is repugnant to the seller's duty to mitigate damages. In one of
the earliest articles to raise objections to the lost volume seller, Professor
Morris Shanker voiced his concern that adoption of the lost volume theory undermines the importance of the duty to mitigate damages under
the Code. 101 Shanker's conclusion was based upon his premise that,
since most sellers have a supply greater than the demand, nearly every
seller could qualify as a lost volume seller.102 As a result, nearly every
buyer, upon a breach, is left with no hope of mitigation. In Shanker's
opinion, the lost volume concept effectively destroys the mitigation of
damages principle, one of the fundamental maxims of contract
remedies. 103
Shanker is not alone in his concerns over the potential negative
effects of the lost volume concept on mitigation principles. In fact, in
the modern lost volume era, it appears that the mitigation argument has
been the only argument used successfully in court to counter a lost volume claim. This is precisely the argument the Superior Court of Pennsylvania employed in 1992 to deny a lost volume claim in Northeastern
Vending Co. v. P.D.O., Inc.1" Northeastern involved a breach of a
lease arrangement and, as such, was outside the scope of Article 2.
Rather than confront the awkward language of section 2-708, the court
addressed the express acceptance of the lost volume theory embodied in
803(a), respectively. Although some language from the August 1994 draft was omitted in the
January 1997 draft, we believe that the sections remain substantively the same. In the
accompanying comment to section 2-821 of the January 1997 draft, the revisors stated that no
effort was made to resolve the lost volume seller issue. However, the drafters indicated that
recovery for lost volume "is still possible under the flexible standards of [§ 2-821(b)]." The
January 1997 draft is available on the internet at <http://www.law.upenn.edullibrary/ulc/ucc2/
text 18.htm>.
101. See Shanker, supra note 12, at 700-01.
102. See id. at 701.
103. See id.
104. 606 A.2d 936 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
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the second Restatement of Contracts.10 Despite the Restatement's clear
endorsement of the lost volume seller and explanation why mitigation
should have no bearing in such situations, the court nevertheless rejected
the lost volume theory because it "erodes the duty to mitigate."' 6 The
court further contended that the lost volume theory would encourage the
07
seller to remain idle, thereby doing nothing to minimize damages.1
The Northeastern court's concern over the potential idleness of the
lost volume seller is completely unwarranted. The lost volume seller, by
definition, does not remain idle. Rather, in order to make a lost volume
claim, the seller must actively pursue a second contract. Therefore, to
contend that the theory of lost volume encourages the seller to do nothing is without merit. Moreover, to claim that the lost volume concept is
inconsistent with mitigation is to countenance a lack of understanding
when mitigation is to be applicable. As already discussed in Part I.B,
supra, as a general rule, the nonbreaching party has a duty to mitigate its
damages by entering into a similar contract. However, the important
qualification to this rule is that if the subsequent contract would have
been made regardless of the breach, then that contract is not taken into
consideration to minimize the damages. This is exactly the rule articulated by the second Restatement of Contracts and which the Northeastern court chose to ignore. The philosophical heart of the lost volume
theory is that the seller would have generated a second sale irrespective
of the buyer's breach. It follows that the lost volume seller cannot possibly mitigate damages. For this reason, the majority of both courts and
commentators have recognized the illegitimacy of the mitigation argument.10 More fatal to this view, even Professor Breen admits that the
mitigation argument is invalid because the definition of the lost volume
seller makes mitigation impossible. 9
2.

THE "DIMINISHED CAPACITY" ARGUMENT

In an early treatise on contract remedies, Professor Samuel Williston expressed doubt about awarding two profits to a lost volume seller.
In making a resale of the goods, Williston argued that the seller "diminishes his capacity to make other sales of his product." 110 Because the
second sale plunges into the seller's market, thereby reducing it by one
customer, the "diminished capacity" argument holds that the award of
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id. at 938.
Id.
See id.
See, e.g., 1 DUNN, supra note 6, § 2.9 (pocket part 1996), at 25; ROBERT J. NORDSTROM,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 177, at 536 (1970); Anderson, supra note 6, at 1055.
109. Breen, supra note 13, at 820-21.
110. 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILISTON ON SALES § 583a (1961).
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two profits for the sale of one set of goods overcompensates the seller.
This same reasoning was the basis of the holding in A. Lenobel, Inc. v.
Senif,"' arguably the case which best articulated an attack on the lost
volume theory. In A. Lenobel, the court reasoned that if the buyer would
have assigned his contract or accepted the goods and resold them to
another buyer in the same market, this action would have depleted the
seller's prospects for an additional sale. 1 2 In such a case, the court
noted that the seller would have been limited to one profit. Therefore,
the court believed it was justified in limiting the seller's damages to one
1 13
profit.
The "diminished capacity" argument is arguably a "red herring"
debate, since its application appears to have validity concerning a seller
who is not a lost volume seller. The lost volume seller in its purest form
would have a potentially extensive market for its goods. This is especially true in the modem global economy where a seller could supply
customers both domestically and internationally. Such was not the case
for a car dealer in a small town in New York in the 1930s, as it was for
the seller in A. Lenobel. In that instance, the buyer could have bought
the car and resold it in competition with the seller, thereby significantly
reducing the seller's already small market. In this context, the "diminished capacity" argument carries its most weight. To understand this is
to realize that if a buyer's actions could significantly impact the seller's
prospects, then that seller is a fortiori not a lost volume seller. In its
purest form, the lost volume seller could have thousands of prospects,
the loss of one of which would be negligible at best.
3. THE COUNTER-HYPOTHETICAL
The "diminished capacity" argument, first recognized in A.
Lenobel, was again used in 1973 by Professor Shanker to attack the lost
volume seller." 4 Although Shanker used this theoretical situation for
his flawed mitigation argument, Professor Breen has resurrected this
scenario, in what he deems the "counter-hypothetical," in yet another
context." 5 In Breen's opinion, the counter-hypothetical succeeds to
rebut the lost volume theory for reasons not fully articulated by either
Shanker or A. Lenobel.
The main force of Breen's argument is that the seller's expectation
interest in the profit from the second sale is unprotected." 6 As illustra111. 300 N.Y.S. 226 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937).
112. Id. at 229.
113. Id. at 230-31.
114. See Shanker, supra note 12, at 701-02.

115. Breen, supra note 13, at 818-19.
116. See id. at 823-27.
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tion, Breen points to the basis of the lost volume seller's claimed expectation interest-that is, the lost volume seller contends that he expected
to sell the goods, plus a second set of the goods to an additional buyer.
Breen cautions that the seller's expectation must only be measured at the
time of entering a valid contract. It is the valid contract that protects the
seller's expectation. Breen explains that at the time of entering into the
original contract with the breaching buyer, the seller merely has a protectable expectation in this contract and the hope of entering a similar
contract with another customer in the future. Thus, at the time of entering into the first contract, the seller has no protectable expectation of a
second sale in the post-contractual market, since the seller has yet to
make the contract for resale. Because the resale occurs after repudiation
of the original contract, in awarding lost profits to the seller, courts
apply the seller's expectation upon resale retroactively, relating back to
the formation of the original contract. Thus, Breen concludes, "the
seller's expectation of an additional sale is a post hoc expectation, which
is an oxymoron."' 1 7 Breen argues that this thesis is the real point of the
counter-hypothetical. That is, the value of the counter-hypothetical is
that it shows the seller to have no protectable interest in the future
118
market.
Breen is correct in his premise that the lost volume seller, at the
time of entering into the original contract, has a protected expectation in
one profit and an unprotected expectation or hope to make similar contracts in the future. The main flaw with Breen's reasoning, however, is
that the lost volume seller's expectation in the second sale is always
unprotected. The lost volume seller's expectation in the second sale is
unprotected until the seller enters into the second contract. At that time,
the seller has a protectable expectation in the original contract, and a
separate and distinct protectable expectation in the second sale. There is
nothing retroactive in the application of the seller's expectation interest
in the second sale. Contrary to Breen's assertion, the lost volume seller
is not claiming a protectable interest in two transactions at the time of
the original sale. Conversely, the lost volume seller claims an expectation in two contracts entered into at different intervals. Thus, the argument over the lost volume seller is not whether the seller has a
protectable expectation in the post-contractual market, but whether, after
the second sale is consummated, the expectation on the second sale
should be used to reduce the expectation interest on the original sale.
A separate problem with the validity of the counter-hypothetical
centers upon the difference between breach and performance. Whether
117. Id. at 824.
118. See id. at 827.
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the buyer assigns his rights under the contract or buys the goods and
attempts a resale, the buyer in such a situation is nonetheless performing
the contract. This is completely unlike a flat breach of contract. The
significance of the counter-hypothetical is to show that buyers who contract with lost volume sellers have a better way to handle the situation
than to breach. As a practical matter, attorneys who counsel these buyers should advise them of this option when the buyer is considering
repudiating the contract.
B.

Revisiting the Lost Volume Problem: New Arguments for the
Lost Volume Seller

The vulnerability of Professor Breen's view that the lost volume
seller should receive only one profit is best demonstrated in a hypothetical situation where Breen's view will produce extremely unfair results.
For example, suppose Boeing contracts to sell ten jets to United Airlines. Shortly after entering into the contract, United decides that it
would rather buy ten jets of comparable quality from McDonnell-Douglas, one of Boeing's chief competitors. Because United knows that Boeing is a lost volume seller who will quickly resell the ten jets to another
airline, United realizes that, under Breen's view, Boeing will have no
recourse, other than nominal damages, against it upon breach. Therefore, United repudiates its contract with Boeing and contracts with
McDonnell-Douglas to buy the ten jets. Subsequently, Boeing resells
the ten jets to American Airlines at the price the jets were to be sold to
United. At the time United breached, Boeing was already negotiating
the deal with American and had the capacity to supply both airlines with
the jets. According to Breen, Boeing should be limited to the contract
price-resell price differential, which in this case is nothing, plus incidental damages. Because Boeing had nearly closed its deal with American
at the time of United's breach, Boeing's expenses in locating a substitute
buyer are minimal, leaving Boeing with little or no incidental damages.
The inequitable result of Breen's view is highlighted by the fact
that Boeing is left with nominal damages while losing not only a sale
and profit, but also a sale to one of its competitors. The effect of
Breen's position is to devalue contracts with lost volume sellers to a
degree that they are rendered worthless. Because such a buyer will be
liable only for nominal damages, the buyer is encouraged in many
instances to breach. Effectively, the buyer in such a case has voidable
contract rights. As a matter of public policy, courts should consider
fashioning contract remedies in order to discourage breach of con-
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tract.1 9 Of course, there are instances where the breaching party may
make an "efficient breach" by paying damages to the aggrieved party
and then entering into another contract. However, the theory is premised upon the condition that the breaching party pay damages to make
the aggrieved party whole. In Breen's view, the buyer essentially pays
no damages to the aggrieved seller in order to contract more favorably.
Therefore, Breen's view is inconsistent even with the theory of efficient
breach.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Breen's article has reopened the lost volume seller
debate, posing new questions and analyzing the problem from a variety
of perspectives. Although Breen makes several plausible arguments
against the lost volume theory and raises issues not yet examined, I am
not convinced that the lost volume theory should be wholly abandoned.
The emphasis that both the proponents and Breen place on the drafting
history of Article 2 in deciding the lost volume debate is near trivial.
Neither side has provided direct evidence that the Code's drafters considered the lost volume problem when drafting Article 2. Moreover, the
next revision of Article 2, eliminating the "due allowance" and "due
credit" language, should redirect the lost volume debate away from linguistic interpretation and towards the important issue-the conceptual
validity of the lost volume seller and the fundamental policy behind
damages.
With regard to the conceptual validity of the lost volume seller,
Breen has simply not demonstrated that limiting the lost volume seller's
damages to one profit is wise and consistent with the Code's policy of
placing the aggrieved party in the same position had the breaching party
fully performed. The counter-hypothetical is ineffective in demonstrating that the seller's expectation in a second profit is unprotected.
Breen's conclusion is clouded by the mistaken assumption that the seller
seeks to establish his expectation interest in two profits at the time of
entering the original contract. Rather, the lost volume seller claims that
he has two separate and distinct expectations-one profit at the time of
entering each respective contract. By focusing upon the seller's unprotectable expectation, Breen's argument misses the real question:
whether the first expectation should be reduced by giving "due credit"
for proceeds on the second contract.
The conceptual analysis of the lost volume seller needs to go
beyond a discussion of the counter-hypothetical. The most critical flaw
119. See Tongish v. Thomas, 840 P.2d 471, 476 (Kan. 1992) (holding that a court should
fashion a remedy in a way that will discourage breach of contract).
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in Breen's position is the failure to justify the inequitable and absurd
results which would result if lost volume sellers are limited to one profit.
In the most egregious circumstance, the abandonment of the lost volume
theory will permit a buyer to breach a contract with a lost volume seller
and make a contract with a competing seller while incurring little or no
liability. One can hardly imagine Breen arguing in good faith that the
lost volume seller has not been damaged in this situation.
The lasting effect and importance of Breen's article is that certain
sub-issues within the lost volume debate should be revisited. However,
the debate should be about whether the lost volume remedy should or
should not exist. Instead, the impact of Breen's article is in raising concerns over the definition and identification of lost volume seller situations. In examining the article, Breen arguably makes a good case that
the lost volume seller may be over applied. Take, for example, Neri v.
Retail Marine Corp.,2 the seminal case for the lost volume doctrine,
the facts of which Breen uses in hypothetical situations throughout his
article. The problem with Neri is that the buyer was an average consumer as opposed to a merchant. The defendant in Neri had to repudiate
the contract because he had to be hospitalized and required surgery. It is
easy to empathize with such a non-culpable breaching buyer. However,
it is important to remember that the breaching buyer, except in cases of
commercial impracticability, is never entirely without fault. One might
argue that the average consumer who breaches a contract with a lost
volume seller is unlucky in that he did not deal with a non-volume seller.
In such an instance, awarding a lost profit to a big commercial seller
against the average consumer seems unjust. 121 As a practical matter,
however, Sears is unlikely to waste its time suing the average consumer
for breach of contract to purchase a washing machine. Even if one concludes that the lost volume theory is unjust with regard to the average
consumer, such a conclusion has absolutely no bearing on lost volume
claims where the buyer is a merchant.
120. 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972).

121. In Stewart Macauley's casebook, Contracts:Law in Action, the authors ponder whether a
lost volume case should be decided differently if the buyer is a merchant or an average consumer.
MACAULEY Er AL., supra note 77, at 77-78. The authors make note of interviews two University
of Washington law students conducted with several car dealers. Id. at 78. Most of the dealers
interviewed responded that they did not know that they could sue a breaching customer for lost
profit. Id. The students observed that
[aIll the dealers we talked to thought that the idea of recovering lost profits was,
from a practical standpoint, "ludicrous." As one dealer put it: "Realistically, how
long could a dealer who sues customers for lost profits last in a competitive market?
Once the word got out, such a reputation would drive customers away."
Id. See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principleand Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. Rav. 741,

797-82 (1982) (arguing that lost volume should only apply where the buyer is a merchant and not
a consumer).

